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The power to spend sits oddly alongside the diminutive list 
of regulatory powers with which the United States Constitution 
invests the nation's legislature. If Congress may harness the 
wealth of the nation to regulate any subject, why the bother with 
an elaborate apportionment of regulatory responsibility between 
nation and states? What principles will reconcile the power to 
spend with the federal framework? I begin by recognizing that 
the power to spend ultimately derives from the power to tax, and 
that the constitutional text has similar things to say about the ex-
ercise of each. Taxation must be "uniform throughout the 
United States."1 Spending must provide for the "common De-
fence and general Welfare of the United States."2 Both powers, 
then, seem to be subject to a limitation upon discriminatory use. 
And for either of those limitations to operate effectively, the 
other must too, and in a congruent way. A requirement not to 
discriminate in what one takes is emptied by freedom to dis-
criminate in what one gives, and vice versa. 
A prohibition of discrimination, not of coercion, is the Con-
stitution's principal limitation upon the federal power to tax and 
spend. A vigorous antidiscrimination principle, however, does 
illuminate the line between conditions on taxing and spending 
which persuade and those which effectively coerce. After re-
counting the ways in which the Supreme Court has shriveled the 
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1. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl.l (emphasis added). 
2. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Constitution's exhortation against discrimination on either side 
of the federal fiscal ledger, I conclude that a reinvigorated ap-
preciation of the power to spend depends upon a reinvigorated 
understanding of the constitutional requirement that taxation be 
uniform throughout the United States. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH DOLE 
In South Dakota v. Dole3 the Supreme Court expounded the 
scope of Congress's power "to ... provide for the common De-
fence [sic] and general Welfare of the United States," and left it 
looking limitless. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for seven 
Justices upheld federal legislation which directed the Secretary 
of Transportation to withhold 5% of federal highway construc-
tion funds from any state "in which the purchase or public pos-
session ... of any alcoholic bevera~e by a person who is less than 
twenty-one years of age is lawful." 
The Court began with the well-settled proposition that "the 
power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys 
for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legisla-
tive power found in the Constitution. "5 There were, however, 
some limitations on use of the power to make payments to the 
states. Most obviously, there was the language through which it 
was conferred: spending must "provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare of the United States."6 Second, conditions 
on spending must be unambiguous.7 Third, conditions on spend-
ing must relate "to the federal interest in particular national pro-
jects or programs. "8 And fourth, other constitutional provisions 
might impose "an independent bar to the conditional grant of 
federal funds." 9 The Chief Justice's opinion also suggested a 
fifth limitation- that some conditions might shift some spending 
from fermissible persuasion to (apparently) impermissible coer-
cion.1 None of these limitations, however, caused the Court to 
impugn the legislation at issue. 
3. 483 u.s. 203 (1987). 
4. 23 u.s.c. § 158. 
5. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). 
6. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. 
7. Id. at 207. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460-64 (1991). 
8. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 
461 (1978)). 
9. Id. at 208. 
10. Id. at 211. 
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Conditional spending analysis both in the Court and in the 
academy11 has focused on the problem of coercion, and this focus 
has lured Court and commentators alike to ask the wrong ques-
tion. Focus on Dole's first limitation reveals that a construction 
of "common Defence and general Welfare of the United States" 
which coheres with the rest of Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 has dramatic im-
plications for the scope of the federal spending power. Consider 
the words in the context in which they appear: 
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States[.]12 
The Dole Court concluded that in construing the critical phrase, 
"courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Con-
gress."13 This may seem sensible when the question is whether 
spending furthers the "Defence" or "Welfare" of the United 
States, but should courts be similarly unwilling to ask whether 
spending is requisitely "common" or "general"? Each question 
invites inquiry into substance-in the cases of defense and wel-
fare, into the nature of the social good, implicating both factual 
and philosophical understanding; in the cases of commonality 
and generality, into the distinctions that are permissible when 
providing for defense and welfare. Constitutional requirements 
of commonality and generality necessarily imply that some cate-
gory of distinctions in spending is impermissible. The question 
prompted by their presence in the constitutional text is not 
whether an antidiscrimination principle limits federal spending, 
but what kind of discrimination that palpably-present principle 
precludes.14 
11. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1911 (1995) (identifying circumstances in which spending should be held subver-
sively coercive, rather than merely persuasive, based on a distinction between "regula-
tory" spending and "reimbursement" spending); see also David E. Engdahl, The Spend-
ing Power, 44 Duke L.J. 1 (1994); Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State, 146-57 
(Princeton U. Press, 1993); William Van Alstyne, "Thiny Pieces of Silver" for the Rights 
of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 
16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 303 (1993); Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Friedman, Condi-
tional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85; Albert J. Rosenthal, 
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1103 (1987); Richard 
B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 917, 970-73 (1985); Lewis B. Kaden, 
Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Col urn. L. Rev. 847 (1979). 
12. U.S. Canst., Art. I,§ 8, cl.l. 
13. Dole,483 U.S. at207. 
14. See Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of 
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This question belongs to the genre of "equality" inquiries 
that courts have often pursued under the rubric of equal protec-
tion, and that have also been held justiciable when their subject 
is taxation. If courts are willing to decide what kind of discrimi-
nation is precluded by a requirement that federal taxation be 
"uniform throughout the United States," why should they not 
similarly decide what kind of discrimination is precluded by a 
requirement that federal spending be "common" and "general"? 
If the two kinds of discrimination are not the same, then the pos-
sibility of effective operation for either is limited to the extent of 
any overlap. This observation about effective operation does 
not resolve the interpretative question, but an "intratextualist" 
approach to interpretation 15 would recognize two implications. 
First, either courts should decide both what uniformity of taxa-
tion requires and what commonality and generality of spending 
require, or courts should leave both questions alone. And sec-
ond, when any branch of government considers whether a kind 
of discrimination in taxing is precluded by the uniformity re-
quirement and whether the same kind of discrimination in 
spending is precluded by the commonality and generality re-
quirements, that branch should give those questions the same 
answer. The requirements of uniformity, commonality, and gen-
erality should be understood to target the same kind of discrimi-
nation. In other words, "common," "general," and "uniform" 
should be understood as three qualifiers designed to do different 
parts of the same job, namely to ensure that federal taxing and 
spending do not distribute burdens and benefits to the people of 
the United States according to an unlawfully discriminatory cri-
terion. If the prohibited criterion for taxing differs from that for 
spending, then the extent of the difference undermines the anti-
discrimination limitations on taxing and spending. But in order 
for the prohibited criterion to be the same for taxing and spend-
ing, it must have a content which plausibly constrains both. 
In this article, I suggest that the criterion prohibited by uni-
formity, commonality, and generality is state political identity. 
Federal taxing and spending cannot validly differ among citizens 
of the United States by reference to the political identities of 
their states. Thus, validity of conditional spending turns not on 
its coercive effect, that is, on how much a prospective beneficiary 
needs the money offered, but on whether that money is being of-
"Equality" in Moral and Legal Discourse (Princeton U. Press, 1990). 
15. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999); Charles L. 
Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Louisiana State U. Press, 1969). 
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fered on terms which discriminate among ultimate beneficiaries 
according to the political identities of the places where they live, 
travel, own property, or do business. 
A conclusion that courts should leave to Congress the ques-
tions of uniformity, commonality, and generality would not, of 
course, diminish in any way the duty of legal scholars to explore 
the content of those concepts. Analysis of what controlling con-
stitutional language may mean retains its importance whoever its 
target audience of decisionmakers may be. 
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF UNIFORMITY 
The presence of an antidiscrimination principle limiting 
federal fiscal behavior has received much more attention on the 
taxation side. Uniformity throughout the United States has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court to require uniformity of rate 
structure, not throughout the range of transactions or the kinds 
of income which may be subjected to taxation, but throughout 
the United States. Until 1983, the Court's jurisprudence clearly 
suggested that the federal tax regime faced by citizens could not 
vary from state to state. 
A. THE TAXES WHICH MUST BE UNIFORM 
The current major sources of federal revenue, notably the 
federal income taxes, are subject to this uniformity requirement. 
"Direct" taxes are not subject to it, for the Constitution requires 
of them a different kind of uniformity, namely uniformity of 
amount per counted person.16 In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and 
Trust Co.,17 the Supreme Court distinguished between taxation 
of income derived from property (that is, taxation of rents, divi-
dends, and interest), which it held to be "direct," and taxation of 
income derived from activity ("professions, trades, employ-
ments, or vocations"), 18 which it held to be indirect. The Court 
had recognized as early as 1796 that compliance with the appor-
tionment requirement was probably more trouble than direct 
taxation was worth, 19 and an exasperated nation responded with 
the sixteenth amendment.20 Thereafter, the Supreme Court de-
16. See Art. I,§ 2, cl. 3 and Art. I,§ 9, cl. 4. 
17. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), vac'd and rev'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
18. 158 U.S. at 637. 
19. See Hylton v. United Scates, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), particularly the opinions 
of Paterson and Iredell, 11. 
20. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from what-
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cided to treat all federal income taxes as "indirect" and therefore 
subject to the uniformity requirement in Art. 1 § 8 cl. 1. Explain-
ing this understanding took just one of Chief Justice White's 
marathon sentences: 
[T]he contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income 
as a direct tax although it is relieved from apportionment and 
is necessarily therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as 
such rule only applies to taxes which are not direct, thus de-
stroying the two great classifications which have been recog-
nized and enforced from the beginning, is wholly without 
foundation since the command of the Amendment that all in-
come taxes shall not be subject to apportionment by a consid-
eration of the sources from which the taxed income may be 
derived, forbids the application to such taxes of the rule ap-
plied in the Pollock Case by which alone such taxes were re-
moved from the great class of excises, duties and imposts sub-
ject to the rule of uniformity and were placed under the other 
or direct class. 21 
This outcome was consistent with Justice Iredell's view in 1796 
that if a federal tax did not neatly fit within the Constitution's 
"direct" category nor within the terms "duty," "impost" or "ex-
cise," then a background principle of uniformity, applicable to 
duties, imposts and excises, would kick in.22 White honored the 
constitutional text by holding that the United States national in-
come tax is to be characterized as a glorified excise duty. 
B. WHAT UNIFORMITY MEANS 
What does uniformity require? Before his elevation to the 
center seat, White had written on the subject at length. In 
Knowlton v. Moore,Z3 his opinion for the Court established that a 
federal tax regime may be uniform even though its effect upon 
citizens in one state differs from its effect upon those in another 
because of differences in state government policy. The required 
uniformity was, he declared, "geographical": 
As the primary rate of taxation depends upon the degree of 
relationship or want of relationship to a deceased person, it is 
ever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without re-
gard to any census or enumeration." 
21. Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1916). For back-
ground commentary, see Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 40-41 (1999). 
22. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 181 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
23. 178 U.S. 41 (1900). 
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argued that it cannot operate with geographical uniformity, 
inasmuch as testamentary and intestacy laws may differ in 
every state. It is certain that the same degree of relationship 
or want of relationship to the deceased, wherever existing, is 
levied on at the same rate throughout the United States, de-
spite the fact that different conditions among the States may 
obtain as to the objects upon which the tax is levied. The 
proposition in substance assumes that the objects taxed by du-
ties, imposts and excises must be found in uniform quantities 
and conditions in the respective States, otherwise the tax lev-
ied on them will not be uniform throughout the United States. 
But what the Constitution commands is the imposition of a 
tax by the rule of geographical uniformity, not that in order to 
levy such a tax objects must be selected which exist uniformly 
in the several States.24 
523 
Giving uniformity a "geographical significance" caused the re-
quirement to "look to the forbidding of discrimination as be-
tween the States, by the levying of duties, imposts or excises 
upon a particular subject in one State and a different duty, im-
post or excise on the same subject in another."25 Thus the 
Court's earlier formulation that a "tax is uniform when it oper-
ates with the same force and effect in every place where the sub-
ject of it is found" was treated as a requirement of equal force 
and effect upon the subject chosen for taxation, not upon the citi-
zen.26 
But what leeway did Congress enjoy in defining the subject 
of taxation? As the facts of Knowlton exemplified, state political 
identity is an implicit component of any subject of taxation. Be-
ing a "beneficiary" for purposes of the federal inheritance tax at 
issue in that case turned on testators' choices made against the 
background of state testamentary and intestacy law. Being a 
"school-age child" for purposes of a federal tax credit to one's 
parents turns on parenting choices made against the background 
of state policies on child care, child tax credits, etc. "Sales" of 
any item for purposes of a federal excise tax are made against a 
background of state law which may require, permit, restrict, or 
prohibit such sales. So state political identity is always an im-
plicit component of that which Congress selects as its subject of 
taxation. But can Congress make state political identity an ex-
24. Id. at 107-08. 
25. Id. at 89. 
26. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,594 (1884); see also Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 86, 
106. 
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plicit component of that which it selects to tax? In other words, 
can Congress identify the fact of states having a particular policy 
or any other fact explicitly about state identity as its subject of 
taxation? For example, could a federal tax regime take "sales of 
widgets in states with policy A" as its subject of taxation and im-
pose no tax on sales of widgets in other states? Or could a fed-
eral tax regime take "sales of widgets in states where fact B oc-
curs" as its subject of taxation, where B is so unrelated to the 
sales of widgets that it can only be expressed as a feature of 
states in which sales occur, not of the sales themselves? In other 
words, can the subject of taxation be explicitly defined by refer-
ence to state political identity? Knowlton suggested that a fed-
eral tax on sales of widgets which is explicitly imposed at higher 
rates in Massachusetts than in Texas would be unconstitutional, 
while a federal tax on sales of widgets imposed at the same rates 
in Massachusetts and Texas would be constitutional even if the 
state of Massachusetts required its citizens to buy a specified 
number of widgets every year and the state of Texas prohibited 
its citizens from buying widgets at all. But what of a federal tax 
which varies by explicit reference to features of state political 
identity other than the state's name? 
Suppose Congress imposes a tax on sales of widgets which 
differs in rate depending on whether the state of sale requires, 
allows, or prohibits sales of widgets. Or imagine a federal tax 
imposed only on sales of widgets in states which have no state 
income tax, or whose state flags sport a particular design. Such 
conditions explicitly reference state political identity whether 
expressed as state policies or as the reflective incidence of other 
facts in states. For example, a condition that states impose no 
income tax and a condition that citizens pay states no income tax 
both explicitly reference state political identity. Are those fed-
eral taxes constitutional, like taxes which do not directly target 
state government behavior but which may indirectly do so? Or 
are they unconstitutional, like taxes which simply subject named 
states to different treatment? An advocate of constitutionality 
may contend that a federal tax attaching state-policy conditions 
is valid so long as all states are legally capable of meeting the 
conditions which afford their taxpayers favored federal treat-
ment. A state may not be capable of unilaterally dropping its 
name or dissolving, but it is capable of changing its flag, its tax 
structure, and most of its other policies. By this reasoning, a 
federal tax which explicitly discriminates by reference to the 
content of state policy is not invalid on that ground so long as 
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the targeted policy is one which states can choose to change, 
even if only by state constitutional amendment. 
This position is supported by Florida v. Mellon,27 in which 
the Supreme Court dismissed Florida's challenge to a federal in-
heritance tax regime despite that regime's inclusion of an 80% 
credit for state inheritance taxes paid. Outraged that its state 
constitution's prohibition of inheritance taxes would no longer 
prove so alluring to wealthy northerners who liked their chil-
dren, Florida contested the federal Act's constitutionality. In a 
four-page opinion the Supreme Court told Florida that its per-
ceived injury was too speculative to afford it standing. In dicta, 
however, the Court also disposed of the state's non-uniformity 
allegation: 
The contention that the federal tax is not uniform because 
other states impose inheritance taxes while Florida does not, 
is without merit. Congress cannot accommodate its legisla-
tion to the conflicting or dissimilar laws of the several states 
nor control the diverse conditions to be found in the various 
states which necessarily work unlike results from the en-
forcement of the same tax. All that the Constitution (Art. I, § 
8, cl.l) requires is that the law shall be uniform in the sense 
that by its provisions the rule of liability shall be the same in 
all parts of the United States.28 
Was the Court reading a different statute? The case did not in-
volve a single federal tax rate working "unlike results" because 
of the "dissimilar laws" and "diverse conditions to be found in 
the various states." This was a federal tax rate which explicitly 
varied by reference to those "dissimilar laws." It was not "the 
same tax" in Florida as it was in states which had homegrown 
death duties. The federal tax regime treated taxpayers differ-
ently, and different treatment depended on the policies of their 
states. Citizens of Florida were required by Congress to pay 
much higher rates of federal inheritance tax than citizens of 
other states had to pay. 
The Court's call for a uniform "rule of liability" begged the 
question. What elements of state identity may Congress sneak 
inside a rule of liability without flouting its constitutional obliga-
tion to tax uniformly throughout the United States? Under 
Knowlton, Congress could not have created a rule of liability ap-
plicable to all sales of widgets throughout the United States 
27. 273 u.s. 12 (1927). 
28. !d. at 17. 
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which had the added characteristic of occurring in states called 
"South Carolina." But could Congress have created a rule of li-
ability applicable to all sales of widgets throughout the United 
States which had the added characteristic of occurring in states 
whose flags sported a bonsai palmetto plant? Are the citizens of 
the Union taxed uniformly when the federal government de-
mands from them rates of tax which differ by explicit reference 
to policies of the states where they live, travel, own property, or 
do business? The Court's glib dicta in Florida v. Mellon failed to 
grapple with this question, and in Poe v. Seaborn29 it treated Mel-
lon as merely a Knowlton re-run: 
And differences of state law, which may bring a person within 
or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, 
may not be read into the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of 
uniformity.?0 
Mellon did not rescue a federal law from having state-law differ-
ences read into it. Mellon upheld a federal law which had state-
law differences written into it. Knowlton established that no uni-
formity issue arises from federal tax law taking state law as it 
finds it. But can federal tax law explicitly not do so, and instead 
set up the content of state law as its criterion of liability? Didn't 
the tax law in Mellon flout the rule in Knowlton? 
An opponent of constitutionality for conditions targeting 
state political identity may contend that state policy is state iden-
tity, because the only legal reason for separate state identities is 
political subdivision. The states' separate existence serves the 
sole legal function of separate policymaking. Thus tax discrimi-
nation based directly on a state government's lawful policy 
choices is tax discrimination based on the state's legal identity. 
It directly attacks a discretionary component of the state's iden-
tity, and indirectly attacks the core of that identity, the discretion 
exercised to create the attacked component. Prohibiting other 
fact conditions which explicitly reference state identity is a corol-
lary of prohibiting state-policy conditions, because there is no 
reason to frame taxation of any subject by explicit reference to 
its incidence in a state except to have its terms serve as a proxy 
for state policy. In response to the observation that any terms of 
federal taxation may interact with state policy choices to affect 
citizens of one state differently from those of another, an oppo-
29. 282 u.s. 92 (1930). 
30. Id. at 117-18 (citing Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12). 
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nent may argue that constitutional uniformity cannot require an 
impossible unraveling of indirect effects, but it must require 
something. The Court claimed to be repeating itself as far back 
as 1884 when it observed that "[p]erfect uniformity and perfect 
equality of taxation, in all the aspects in which the human mind 
can view it, is a baseless dream, as this court has said more than 
once."31 But that did not cause the Court to give up and treat 
the requirement as empty. 
A principle that Congress cannot make state political iden-
tity a condition of federal taxation is just as manageable as the 
de minimis uniformity principle under Knowlton that Congress 
cannot make a state's name a condition of federal taxation. And 
the broader principle against targeting state government behav-
ior goes much further toward invigorating the uniformity re-
quirement. As the Pollock Court recounted, the founding gen-
eration did not expect the requirement of uniformity to prove 
chimerical: 
[W]hen the wealthier States as between themselves and their 
less favored associates, and all as between themselves and 
those who were to come, gave up for the common good the 
great sources of revenue derived through commerce, they did 
so in reliance on the protection afforded by restrictions on the 
grant of the power.32 
Joseph Story explained in his Commentaries that the uniformity 
clause was "founded in a wholesome and strenuous jealousy, 
31. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595. 
32. 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278 (1901) 
(Brown, J.): 
In determining the meaning of the words of Article I, section 6 [sic), "uniform 
throughout the United States," we are bound to consider not only the provi-
sions forbidding preference being given to the ports of one State over those of 
another ... but the other clauses declaring that no tax or duty shall be laid on 
articles exported from any State, and that no State shall, without the consent of 
Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, nor any duty on 
tonnage. The object of all of these was to protect the States which united in 
forming the Constitution from discriminations by Congress, which would oper-
ate unfairly or injuriously upon some States and not equally upon others .... 
Thus construed together, the purpose is irresistible that the words "throughout 
the United States" are indistinguishable from the words "among or between the 
several States." 
Unfortunately, Justice Brown's "opinion of the Court" was his alone. The Court had 
split 5-4 concerning application of constitutional limits on taxing to Congress's regulation 
of the Puerto Rican territory, and Brown's hefty 40-page opinion (in the eye-straining 
micro-font of 182 U.S.) for the majority view that those limits did not apply risked his 
emergence from obscurity. That risk was obviated when none of his colleagues signed on. 
Justice White wrote a salvaging 60-page concurrence which is politely described in the 
report as "uniting in the judgment of affirmance." 
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which, foreseeing the possibility of mischief, guards with solici-
tude against any exercise of power, which may endanger the 
states, as far as it is practicable. "33 
During the ratification debates, even the proposed constitu-
tion's most insightful and vociferous detractors did not dream 
that the uniformity clause would permit discriminatory taxation 
by reference to state policy. In his Genuine Information speech 
to the Maryland legislature, Luther Martin described how taxes 
imposed at uniform rates could burden some states more than 
others, depending on which items Congress selected for taxation. 
But despite scouring for defects in the proposed federal taxing 
power, he treated as self-evident the proposition that uniformity 
called for taxes "to be laid to the same amount on the same arti-
cles in each State."34 
To infer constitutional uniformity from a uniformly applied 
state-policy condition on taxation solely because states can 
change their policies is weak even in relation to federal taxation 
of the state, let alone direct taxation of citizens. Either way the 
people are the ultimate payees. Should not the uniformity of a 
liability or a benefit be judged in the shoes of those to whom that 
liability or benefit ultimately belongs? Writing for the post-New 
Deal Court in Fernandez v. Wiener,35 Chief Justice Stone ob-
served that the uniformity clause "requires only that what Con-
gress has properly selected for taxation must be identically taxed 
in every state where it is found. "36 Could this ostensibly inno-
cent concept really conceal congressional power to tax citizens 
for their states' policies? Could those policies be "properly se-
lected for taxation"? A businessman who must pay different 
rates of federal tax in different states on sales of the same item 
would be bewildered by a claim that federal taxation was "uni-
form throughout the United States." Of course, he could just 
stop doing business in the states targeted for higher federal taxa-
tion, and, indeed, the hapless inhabitants of the disfavored state 
could always move elsewhere. But those were the very scenarios 
that induced the founding generation to adopt the constitutional 
requirement of uniformity and its counterparts?7 
33. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 954 (Hilliard, Gray, and 
Company, 1833). 
34. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information, delivered to the Legislature of the 
State of Maryland, November 29, 1787, reprinted in Max Farrand, ed., 3 The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787 at 172,205 (Yale U. Press,1937). 
35. 326 u.s. 340 (1945). 
36. Id. at 361. 
37. For a substantial historical survey, see Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause?, 
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The balance of this article is predicated on the proposition 
that the constitutional requirement of uniform taxation through-
out the United States prohibits Congress from treating citizens 
differently by explicit reference to the policies of the places 
where they live, travel, own property, or do business. Where 
their states' policies make a federal tax regime more burden-
some than it is in other states, even though that regime is applied 
to them by the federal government in the same way as it is ap-
plied to citizens elsewhere, taxpayers have no constitutional 
complaint. But where the federal government taxes citizens dif-
ferently on the basis of their states' policies, or taxes states dif-
ferently on the basis of their policies, it fails to tax uniformly 
"throughout the United States." 
C. STEWARD MACHINE CO. V. DAVIS 
An opponent of state-policy conditions on federal taxation 
must, however, address the Court's approving citation and ap-
parent afplication of Florida v. Mellon in Steward Machine Co. 
v. Davis. The Court in Steward upheld a federal payroll tax re-
gime that afforded employers a credit of up to 90% for contribu-
tions to state social security schemes meeting federal standards.39 
But Justice Cardozo's much cited opinion was carefully confined 
to recognizing Congress's power to give state governments a 
choice of methods by which a federal program of taxing and 
spending is implemented. In particular, Congress may give state 
governments the option of participating in a federal plan by per-
forming the taxing and spending contemplated by the plan. 
When Congress directs the federal government to do the taxing 
and spending only where state governments choose not to par-
ticipate, it does not violate its obligation to tax uniformly. State 
taxes imposed pursuant to the federal plan must be considered 
part of the federal tax regime for purposes of the uniformity 
clause (though not for purposes of constitutional restrictions on 
delegating powers!). The federal government's program treats 
citizens uniformly if the combination of federal and state taxes 
imposed pursuant to it achieves that uniformity. Just as Con-
gress, when possessed of direct regulatory power over a subject, 
may offer states a choice of regulating by federal standards or 
33 Marshall L. Rev. 81 (1999). 
38. 301 u.s. 548,583, 591·92 (1937). 
39. ld. at 548. 
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being pushed aside by direct federal regulation,40 so Congress, in 
the exercise of its taxing and spending power, may offer states a 
choice of taxing and spending by federal standards or being 
pushed aside (effectively, given a limited tax base) by direct fed-
eral taxing and spending. 
Steward highlights the obverse relation of taxing and spend-
ing. To know whether a federal tax imposed at a higher rate on 
those whose state governments choose not to tax and spend in a 
particular way discriminates against those taxpayers, one must 
ascertain whether they benefited from higher, offsetting federal 
spending. That's why the federal tax in Florida v. Mellon was 
truly discriminatory-the federal government taxed Floridians at 
a higher rate than the citizens of other states, without any ob-
verse federal-spending upside. There was no legal guarantee of 
such an upside in the federal scheme at issue in Steward either, 
but Cardozo explained at length that taxing and spending for the 
purposes of the scheme would be similarly reciprocal for the 
people of all states, irrespective of their state governments' pol-
icy choices. First, he noted that the proceeds of the federal tax 
would at most be a small fraction of federal spending on public 
works and unemployment relief.41 Then he elaborated: 
Every dollar of the new taxes will continue in all likelihood to 
be used and needed by the nation as long as states are unwill-
ing, whether through timidity or for other motives, to do what 
can be done at home. At least the inference is permissible 
that Congress so believed, though retaining undiminished 
freedom to spend the money as it pleased. On the other hand 
fulfilment of the home duty will be lightened and encouraged 
by crediting the taxpayer upon his account with the Treasury 
of the nation to the extent that his contributions under the 
laws of the locality have simplified or diminished the problem 
of relief and the probable demand upon the resources of the 
fisc. Duplicated taxes, or burdens that approach them, are 
recognized hardships that government, state or national, may 
properly avoid.42 
Steward was limited to approving provision "that a tax will be 
abated upon the doing of an act that will satisfy the fiscal need, 
40. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 288 
(1981); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
41. See 301 U.S. at 587,585 n.8. 
42. Id. at 588-89. 
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the tax and the alternative being approximate equivalents. "43 
The Court explicitly declined to approve state-policy conditions 
which did more than afford state governments the chance to par-
ticipate in national programs of taxing and spending that would 
be happening anyway: 
We do not say that a tax is valid, when imposed by act of 
Congress, if it is laid upon the condition that a state may es-
cape its operation through the adoption of a statute unrelated 
in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of na-
tional policy and power. No such question is before us. In the 
tender of this credit Congress does not intrude upon fields 
foreign to its function. The purpose of its intervention, as we 
have shown, is to safeguard its own treasury and as an inci-
dent to that protection to place the states upon a footing of 
equal opportunity.44 
The Steward opinion purports to dispose of the question of 
uniformity quite cursorily, and it treats the question of unconsti-
tutional coercion as wholly separate. Yet the Court's analysis 
under that separate heading, summarized above, in fact speaks 
to the problem of discrimination, of non-uniformity. Had the 
Court fully appreciated this, discerning the point at which per-
suasion ends and effective coercion begins would not have 
seemed so imponderable. 
[T]he location of the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a 
question of degree,-at times, perhaps, of fact. The point had 
not been reached when Alabama made her choice. We 
cannot say that she was acting, not of her unfettered will, but 
under the strain of a persuasion equivalent to undue 
influence, when she chose to have relief administered under 
laws of her own making, by agents of her own selection, 
instead of under federal laws, administered by federal offi-
cials, with all the ensuing evils, at least to many minds, of 
federal patronage and power.45 
When discnminatory distribution of burdens and benefits is rec-
ognized to be the unconstitutional evil, the line between persua-
sion and effective coercion is illuminated: a state is not coerced 
when it is merely given a chance to do what the federal govern-
ment will otherwise do for its citizens; a state is effectively co-
erced when the federal government proposes to benefit its citi-
43. Id. at 591. 
44. Id. at 590-91. 
45. Id. at 590. 
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zens only if state policy conforms to federal will. Critical to Car-
dozo's analysis was the expectation that nonparticipating states, 
whose citizens could not claim the benefit of a federal tax credit, 
would receive the alternative benefit of higher federal welfare 
spending. To take Alexander Hamilton's words, "[t]he wants of 
the Union are to be supplied in one way or another" -either by 
the federal government, or by the state governments. "The 
quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same 
in either case .... "46 Steward turned on the judicial expectation 
that citizens throughout the United States would end up paying 
uniform taxes and receiving uniform benefits under a federal 
program implemented through intergovernmental collaboration. 
Steward is consistent with a principle that a federal tax re-
gime must not discriminate among citizens by reference to their 
states' policies. But Steward suggests that a federal regime does 
not violate that principle when it allows state governments to 
substitute themselves for the federal government in implement-
ing a federal program. 
D. PTASYNSKI: FROM GEOGRAPHY TO POLICY 
This understanding of Steward comports with the Court's 
reading of precedent in its most recent encounter with the uni-
formity clause. In 1983 a unanimous Court concluded: "the Uni-
formity Clause requires that an excise tax apply, at the same 
rate, in all portions of the United States where the subject of the 
tax is found. "47 The Court's articulation of principle reprised 
Knowlton's call for "geographical" uniformity. But the Court's 
application of principle did not. The Court upheld a tax exemp-
tion for oil produced "(1) from a reservoir from which oil has 
been produced in commercial quantities through a well located 
north of the Arctic Circle, or (2) from a well located on the 
northerly side of the divide of the Alaska-Aleutian Range and at 
least 75 miles from the nearest point on the Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line System. "48 In a decision which the Court has never cited 
since, Ptasynski endorsed this explicit tax discrimination in favor 
of a region of one state (plus some rather chilly territorial wa-
ters) on the ground that Congress had been motivated by "neu-
46. Federalist 36 (Hamilton) in Ointon Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 185, 190 
(Mentor, 1961). 
47. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74,84 (1983). 
48. 26 U.S.C. § 4994(e) (defining "exempt Alaskan oil") (exempted by 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4991(b)(3)); see Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 77. 
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tral factors"49 and did not thereby accomplish "actual geographic 
discrimination. "50 
But of course Congress did. To be sure, earlier cases had 
not settled what distinctive physical features of territory could 
"neutrally" enter the subject of taxation. (Could "proximity to a 
Grand Canyon" be a valid criterion of liability?) But the distinc-
tive physical feature of falling within specified coordinates on 
the earth's surface is the minimum that geographical definition 
can mean. If Congress can validly define its subject of taxation 
by reference to the geographical location of that subject's inci-
dence, then calling the Constitution's requirement of uniformity 
"geographical" makes no sense at all. If the uniformity clause 
really protects against discrimination by reference to geographi-
cal location, then Ptasynski's reasoning implies that the clause's 
guarantee evaporates whenever it can be circumvented. 
Where Congress defines the subject of a tax in nongeographic 
terms, the Uniformity Clause is satisfied. See Knowlton v. 
Moore, 178 U.S., at 106. We cannot say that when Congress 
uses geographic terms to identify the same subject, the classi-
fication is invalidated.51 
Yet the Constitution may forbid Congress from accomplishing a 
goal in one way while failing to forbid its accomplishment in 
others.52 Congress can choose how it defines its subjects of taxa-
tion, and achieve all sorts of indirect interactions with state pol-
icy by how it does so. But if something which is an aspect of 
state identity for purposes of the uniformity clause may be 
slipped into Congress's definition of a subject of taxation, then a 
uniformity inquiry is impossible. When asking whether a subject 
is taxed uniformly throughout the United States, definitive fea-
tures of state identity must be severed from the subject's defini-
tion, for such features are the question's quarry. Where they do 
form part of Congress's definition, we know the answer is no. 
Lest the uniformity clause be completely deconstructed, 
Ptasynski must be read to hold that geography is not a protected 
aspect of state identity for purposes of the clause. Congress had 
clearly departed from geographical uniformity, but this did not 
49. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 84. 
52. "The Constitution permits Congress to govern only through certain chan-
nels. . . . [I]t is no answer to argue that Congress could have reached the same destina-
tion by a different route." FERC, 456 U.S. at 786, (O'Connor, J., joined by Burger, C.J., 
and Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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matter because the Court thought the departure fair and reason-
able. The Court deferred to Congressional judgment on the 
question, concluding that "[w]e cannot fault [Congress's] deter-
mination, based on neutral factors, that this oil required separate 
treatment. "53 The decision lets Congress depart from geographi-
cal uniformity by satisfying a rational basis test featuring some 
"fairness" embroidery. But as the English have long been fond 
of saying, equity varies with the Lord Chancellor's shoe size. 
Some legislators and courts might well think fair and reasonable 
a federal tax regime which taxed at higher rates the citizens of 
states which enjoy "windfall" revenues from disproportionate 
endowments of natural resources, or which benefit from "wind-
fall" low energy costs because of a balmy climate. Or policy-
makers might conclude that a state whose citizens caught the 
crest of a technological wave should be taxed more steeply than 
a state which languishes in agrarian poverty. The decision that 
oil production "north of the Arctic Circle or on the northerly 
side of the divide of the Alaska-Aleutian Range and at least 75 
miles from the nearest point on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline sys-
tem" will be taxed less than oil production elsewhere in the 
United States because the favored region is especially inhospita-
ble and inaccessible looks awfully like a policy choice not to tax 
a specified subject at the same rate "throughout the United 
States." It may be a wise choice (though that may not be as ob-
vious to all economists as it was to the Court) and its objective 
could doubtless be accomplished by direct use of nongeographic 
criteria which concretely gauge inhospitality and inaccessibility. 
But is it a choice which a government subject to a uniformity-of-
taxation requirement should be able to make?54 
The Ptasynski Court said yes, but in language which pre-
supposed that some departures from geographic uniformity 
would not be requisitely fair. What bases for departure did the 
53. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85. 
54. The Court's affirmative answer was partly prompted by its decision in the Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974). The legislation there at issue 
made special provision for railroad reorganizations within a defined part of the United 
States, and the Court upheld it even though Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 empowers Congress to estab-
lish only "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 
That decision, though questionable, was distinguishable, because the Court there had 
taken judicial notice of the fact that the subject of special bankruptcy regulation (railroad 
reorganizations) did not occur outside the specified region during the life of the Act. I d. 
at 159-61. Thus the Act's discrimination was only formal, not factual. But Congress's 
discrimination in favor of oil production from a particular part of Alaska was thoroughly 
factual. No exemption would have been made absent the principal tax, and no tax would 
have been imposed absent a tax base. 
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Court consider impermissible? In other words, what really de-
fines state identity for purposes of the uniformity clause? The 
Ptasynski Court did intimate what is prevented by a uniformity 
requirement which sometimes tolerates geographic discrimina-
tion. The discriminatory exemption at issue was, the Court ob-
served, "not drawn on state political lines."55 Thus the Court 
implied that the evil which the uniformity clause precludes is dis-
crimination by reference to a state's political identity. And what 
is that but a bundle of policies? Whatever the merits of Ptasyn-
ski's disregard of geographical uniformity, the case supports a 
conclusion that Congress may not insert a state's policies among 
criteria for liability to federal taxation. Of course, place names 
are just policies, but are sufficiently immutable to serve as reli-
able proxies for other place characteristics. The Court held that 
states or parts of states may be explicitly picked out by Congress 
for different tax treatment, so long as the Court is satisfied that 
the different treatment is rational and not prompted by those 
states' political identities. But if the criterion for different 
treatment is location, and the courts cannot find any "neutral" 
basis for the different treatment, then discrimination is either ir-
rational or based on states' political identities. Moreover, as al-
ready noted, a prohibition on taxing by reference to state politi-
cal identity precludes not only conditions which explicitly 
reference state policy, but also any other fact conditions explic-
itly referenced to state identity (conditions in the form "in states 
which ... "56). Out of the haze in which Ptasynski leaves the is-
sue of geographical uniformity, one proposition emerges visibly: 
Congress may not make state political identity a criterion of li-
ability to federal taxation. In the balance of this article, I build 
on the proposition that the uniformity-of-taxation clause re-
quires exclusion of state policy from the subjects of federal taxa-
tion, because what states do is who they are. Policy and identity 
are one. 
If Congress cannot impose different tax rates on citizens by 
reference to state policy, it follows that Congress cannot afford 
rebates to taxpayers by reference to state policy. Nor may Con-
gress impose discriminatory tax rates or rebates upon state gov-
ernments themselves by reference to their policy choices. The 
principle to be applied pervasively is that the ultimate taxpayers, 
55. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 78. 
56. I am indebted to Nick Quinn Rosenkranz for this description of the prohibited 
form. 
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the citizens, cannot be treated less favorably by their federal 
government explicitly because of their states' policies. 
III. UNIFORMITY AND GENERALITY 
A. THE OBVERSE RELATION OFT AXING AND SPENDING 
In Knowlton v. Moore,57 Justice White recounted the gene-
sis of the uniformity-of-taxation requirement during the Confed-
eration, and concluded: 
The proceedings of the Continental Congress also make it 
clear that the words "uniform throughout the United States," 
which were afterwards inserted in the Constitution of the 
United States, had, prior to its adoption, been frequently 
used, and always with reference purely to a geographical uni-
formity and as synonymous with the ex~ression, "to operate 
generally throughout the United States." 8 
The obligation to keep taxes "uniform throughout the United 
States" informs the requirement that spending be "common" 
and "general." Just as uniformity speaks to the structure of fed-
eral taxation with which the citizen is presented, so commonality 
and generality speak to the structure of federal spending with 
which the citizen is presented. When we ask whether taxation is 
uniform, we do so on behalf of the ultimate taxpayer. When we 
ask whether spending is common and general, we do so on be-
half of the ultimate beneficiary- the citizen, not his state gov-
ernment. State government identity is relevant for the role it 
cannot play-it cannot be the basis for discrimination among 
citizens in federal provision of defense and welfare. "Common" 
and "general" are to spending what "uniform" is to taxing. If 
this be accepted, then federal annoyance that states choose to 
exercise their constitutional powers contrary to federal prefer-
ences can no more justify departure from generality in spending 
than from uniformity in taxing. On neither side of the federal 
fiscal ledger may Congress discriminate between two neighbors 
because a state border runs between them. 
The obverse relation of taxation and spending is recognized 
in the structure of Art. I § 8 cl. 1. Congress can do two things 
with the money it raises from the people of the states. It can 
hand the money back to taxpayers via rebates, or it can spend 
57. 178 u.s. 41 (1900). 
58. Id. at 96. 
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the money "to pay the Debts and provide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare of the United States." If handing the 
money back in a way which discriminates between taxpayers 
based on state policy violates the uniformity-of-taxation re-
quirement, how can spending be for the "common Defence and 
general Welfare" of the people of the states if it effects the same 
functional discrimination? Whether state acquiescence in fed-
eral policy proposals is the criterion for a rebate to the state's 
citizens (thus enlarging the state's own tax base) or for a pay-
ment to the state (diminishing the state's need to tax its citizens 
by an identical amount) is surely irrelevant. How can a federal 
spending program be for the "common Defence and general 
Welfare" of the people of the states when citizens receive or 
miss out on its benefits by federal reference to the policies of 
their states? If such a program is blameless, then the uniformity 
requirement for taxation is completely pointless, because there is 
no evil of discriminatory taxation which cannot be accomplished 
through discriminatory spending of the proceeds. As noted ear-
lier, this intratextualist argument for treating two formal re-
quirements of constitutional text as requiring the same thing is 
not conclusive for interpretation. If historical evidence pointed 
to an original vision of their interaction at odds with this reason-
ing, then interpreters might conclude that an incongruity of prin-
ciples governing taxation and principles governing spending was 
just an instance of the Constitution "permit[ting] Congress to 
govern only through certain channels. "59 But absent historical 
evidence of an original expectation that the text's limitations on 
taxing and spending would work in different ways (and I have 
found none), the argument advanced here deserves weight. 
A unanimous Court acknowledged the obverse relation of 
taxing and spending in Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, con-
ceding that "a federal tax levied for the express purpose of pay-
ing the debts or providing for the welfare of a state might be in-
valid."60 The Court cited Justice Catron's opinion in the 
Passenger Cases: 
Congress has no power to lay any but uniform taxes when 
regulating foreign commerce to the end of revenue,- taxes 
equal and alike at all the ports of entry, giving no one a pref-
erence over another. Nor has Congress power to lay taxes to 
59. FERC, 456 U.S. at 786, (O'Connor, 1., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
60. 301 u.s. 308, 317 (1937). 
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pay the debts of a State, nor to provide by taxation for its 
general welfare. Congress may tax for the treasury of the Un-
ion, and here its power ends. 61 
If spending were not general throughout the Union, then the 
corresponding taxation would not be uniform. Hence the flaw in 
the Court's reasoning that "legislation enacted pursuant to the 
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for 
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed 
conditions."62 This passage makes "federal funds" sound like 
manna from heaven, the product of some undeserved ethereal 
beneficence. But federal funds are mainly tax receipts, the 
product of citizens' labors here on earth. That money belongs to 
the people of the states. As Professor Epstein said of Dole's 
facts: 
South Dakota must continue to pay the same level of taxes, 
even though the money it contributes is diverted to other 
states. The offer of assistance is not an isolated transaction, 
but must (as with the thief who will resell stolen goods to its 
true owner) be nested in its larger coercive context. The 
situation in Dole is scarcely distinguishable from one in which 
Congress says that it will impose a tax of x percent on a state 
that does not comply with its alcohol regulations-a rule that 
is wholly inconsistent with the preservation of any independ-
ent domain of state power.63 
The uniformity-of-taxation, common defense, and general wel-
fare requirements work together to make the total fiscal relation 
of the federal government to the citizen analogous to contract-
hardly a new insight in political theory. In return for submission 
to taxation, the citizen gains the benefits of government. Gov-
ernment determines the distribution of benefits, but uniformity, 
commonality, and generality preclude government from doing so 
explicitly by reference to where among the states the citizen 
lives, travels, owns property, or does business. 
But a simple requirement of geographical uniformity, rec-
ognized by the Court as problematic on the taxation side, would 
be even more so on the spending side. If Congress were unable 
to identify geographical locations for its spending, and had in all 
cases to specify only generalized criteria, then the power to 
pork-barrel would simply roll down Pennsylvania Avenue to the 
61. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,446 (1849). 
62. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
63. Epstein, Bargaining with the State at 152 (cited in note 11). 
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Executive. As recounted already, the Court's uniformity-clause 
jurisprudence now prohibits discrimination not on the basis of 
geography per se, but on the basis of state political identity. And 
a prohibition of that criterion may operate with equal efficacy on 
the spending side. 
Holding the generality required of federal spending to pre-
clude explicit conditioning upon state political identity also com-
ports with the way in which the word "general" is deployed in 
Article IV §1 of the Constitution. 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. 
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner 
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, 
and the Effect thereof. 
Could Congress condition its provision for proving state law 
upon the policy content of that law? 
B. WHAT GENERALITY MEANS 
When endorsing the Hamiltonian vision of power to spend 
beyond the subjects of federal regulation, the Court in United 
States v. Butler emphasized the relation of taxing and spending 
by calling general welfare a limitation upon both: 
These words cannot be meaningless, else they would not have 
been used. The conclusion must be that they were intended 
to limit and define the granted power to raise and to expend 
money. . . . While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlim-
ited, its confines are set in the clause which confers it, and not 
in those of § 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers 
of the Congress. 64 
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in 1950, echoed Butler's 
assessment: "Congress has a substantive power to tax and ap-
propriate for the general welfare, limited only by the require-
ment that it shall be exercised for the common benefit as distin-
guished from some mere local purpose. "65 How can a criterion 
of "common benefit" be met by a federal spending regime which 
confers or denies benefits to citizens by reference to the policies 
of their states? 
64. 297 U.S. 1, 65, 66 (1936). 
65. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725,738 (1950). 
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Debates from the founding era are replete with references 
to the general government and the general legislature, meaning 
the government and legislature over the whole.66 The "general 
Welfare," for promotion of which the Constitution was created,67 
is the welfare of the whole United States.68 It is not an abstrac-
tion that authorizes any spending which benefits anyone within 
the United States. Speaking of that "general Welfare," Alexan-
der Hamilton explained: 
The only qualification of the generallity [sic] of the Phrase in 
question, which seems to be admissible, is this-That the ob-
ject to which an appropriation of money is to be made be 
General and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by 
possibility, throughout the Union, and not being confined to a 
particular spot. 69 
When asking whether federal spending to meet a particular 
need provides for the general Welfare of the United States, two 
elements of the inquiry must be distinguished. First, is the need 
sufficiently widespread or weighty for spending to serve the gen-
eral Welfare? An affirmative answer is necessary, but not suffi-
cient, for constitutionality. This inquiry into the nature of the 
need may be characterized as asking whether spending to meet it 
would really provide for the "Welfare of the United States." But 
second, is the spending applied generally? Hamilton's formula-
tion makes clear that an appropriation does not constitutionally 
serve a general object unless it serves that object generally. A 
66. See, for example, the following references recorded in notes from the Philadel-
phia convention: Farrand, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 242, 287, 338, 355, 357 
(cited in note 34). From the debates surrounding ratification, see James Monroe, Some 
Observations on the Constitution, 1788 (suppressed pamphlet), reprinted in Herbert J. 
Storing, ed., 5 The Complete Anti-Federalist 291 (U. of Chicago Press, 1981); Brutus, in 
Morton Borden, ed., The Antifederalist Papers 240 (Michigan State U. Press, 1965); Fed-
eralist 9 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 39 (Mentor, 1961); 
Jonathan Elliot, ed., 2 The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution 376 (Lippincott Press, 1881). From the debate over the Alien 
Enemies and Sedition Acts of 1798, see the Kentucky Resolutions (drafted by Thomas 
Jefferson), reprinted in Elliot's 4 Debates at 540. 
67. The Preamble to the Constitution proclaims provision for "common defence" 
and promotion of "general Welfare" to be foundational bases for creation of the new 
order. 
68. See generally Renz, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 81 (cited in note 37) (adducing his-
torical evidence that "[t]he General Welfare Clause was a reaction to perceived and ac-
tual abuses by Parliament and the English monarchy .... [T]he States wanted to ensure 
that Congress did not tax one state or one region for the benefit of the others."). Id. at 
127. 
69. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of the Report on the Subject of the Manufac-
tures (Dec. 5, 1791 ), reprinted in Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds., 10 The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton 230, 303 (Columbia U. Press, 1966). 
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spending program explicitly for education in three states is not 
made "general" by the fact that need for education is widespread 
throughout the United States. The object "to which an appro-
priation of money is to be made" must extend "in fact, or by pos-
sibility, throughout the Union." Hamilton's "or by possibility" 
recognizes that a state whose citizens in fact are a bunch of land-
locked retirees may constitutionally receive no share of federal 
funding for schools and ports-incidence of federal funding must 
turn on where its objects actually are. But the objects of federal 
funding must not be defined by reference to the political identi-
ties of the states. "Or by possibility" would be violated by a fed-
eral appropriation for schools and ports which foreclosed the 
possibility of its objects being found in State X by defining its ob-
jects as "schools and ports not in State X." The reasoning in 
Ptasynski enables Congress to set priorities for spending on dis-
crete capital projects, like dams and canals, by identifying their 
geographical locations, rather than simply appropriating funds to 
be spent according to priorities set by the federal executive. But 
the Ptasynski principle also insists that the Court scrutinize geo-
graphically specific spending and strike it down if designed to 
discriminate based on state political identity. 
In the course of his famous two-opinion welcome to the 
New Deal,70 Justice Cardozo examined the concept of "general 
Welfare," using language which has since been much cited and 
much misunderstood. Having noted the triumph of Hamilton's 
conception of federal spending over that of James Madison, 
which would have confined spending to subjects within federal 
regulatory power/1 he continued: 
Yet difficulties are left when the power is conceded. The line 
must still be drawn between one welfare and another, be-
tween particular and general. Where this shall be placed can-
not be known through a formula in advance of the event. 
There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which 
discretion is at large. The discretion, however, is not confided 
in the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the 
choice is clearly wronfo, a display of arbitrary power, not an 
exercise of judgment.7 
70. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 
301 u.s. 619 (1937). 
71. See, for example, the letter of Madison to Andrew Stevenson, Nov. 17, 1830, in 
Farrand, 3 Records of the Federal Convention at 483-94 (cited in note 34). 
72. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640. 
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The discretion in Cardozo's sights concerned how to decide what 
spending purposes really promote the welfare of the nation and 
are appropriately pursued at the national level. 
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that 
were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in 
our day with the well-being of the Nation .... Spreading from 
State to State, unemployment is an ill not particular but gen-
eral, which may be checked, if Congress so determines, by the 
resources of the Nation .... 
When money is spent to promote the general welfare, the 
concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not 
the states. So the concept be not arbitrary, the locality must 
yield.73 
Cardozo's conclusion in Helvering v. Davis was that courts will 
not second-guess Congress's determination that a need for 
spending is sufficiently widespread or weighty for responsive 
spending to serve the general Welfare of the United States. But 
that's just the first element of the inquiry. Congress's responsive 
spending must not be "arbitrary." For Congress to distinguish 
between prospective beneficiaries by reference to the political 
identities of their states would be "a display of arbitrary power." 
That Cardozo's deprecation of arbitrary Congressional classifica-
tions was directed to the issue of generality of application is 
made clear by the final passage quoted above. The "locality 
must yield" when the nation wishes to move in with spending, 
because otherwise the spending program would be "arbitrary." 
Why arbitrary? Because the generality of federal spending 
would be compromised. And the generality with which spending 
is applied, like the uniformity with which taxation is imposed, is 
a question for logical analysis, not impressionistic social pulse-
taking. Thus courts will decide whether Congressional spending 
for a "general" purpose is properly general in application. 
Dole relied on Cardozo's analysis in Helvering v. Davis for 
the proposition that "courts should defer substantially to the 
judgment of Congress."74 The Court in Dole added a footnote: 
"The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that 
the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general wel-
fare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all."75 Buckley does 
73. Id. at 641,645. 
74. 483 U.S. at 207. 
75. Id. at 207 n.2 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam)). 
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indeed say that "[i]t is for Congress to decide which expenditures 
will promote the general welfare,"76 and cites an authority for 
that proposition-Helvering v. Davis. Buckley means whatever 
Davis means, and Davis means that welfare, not generality of 
application, is non-justiciable. Cardozo gave no reason to doubt 
that generality of application must ultimately be determined by 
courts. 
And what goes for generality also goes for commonality. 
When, a skeptic may inquire, would the courts ever impugn 
Congress's defense spending for want of commonality? Well, 
imagine eventual establishment of an antiballistic missile defense 
system whose interceptor rockets do not suffer from their proto-
types' disinclination to hit targets. Then imagine Congress 
threatening to withhold coverage from any state which failed to 
implement a federal policy proposal, such as the minimum drink-
ing age at issue in Dole. Or imagine Congressional appropria-
tions for sophisticated fallout shelters only in those states which 
implement such a federal policy proposal. Perhaps Congress is 
so conscious of its patriotic duty to defend all citizens that using 
defense spending for policy leverage over the states holds less 
appeal than using other spending in that way. Location of de-
fense facilities is, of course, a subject of great competition among 
the states, but wherever located, those facilities serve to defend 
the whole United States. One can hardly conceive of Congress 
discriminating in its provision of the benefit of defense between 
citizens by reference to their states' policies. The federal gov-
ernment is independently obliged to protect states from inva-
sion,77 but a requirement to provide the same quality of protec-
tion to all states must come from the Constitution's call for 
commonality if from anywhere. Provision would not be for 
"common Defence" if some states scored the shield and the shel-
ters, while others were left with a mere promise of protection. 
Why, then, is equivalent discrimination in Congress's provision 
of other benefits to citizens not precluded by the Constitution's 
equivalent qualification of the power to spend for their welfare? 
The argument that such discrimination is precluded was ar-
ticulated with a coherence not seen since by counsel in the first 
challenge heard by the Court to conditional federal spending. In 
Massachusetts v. Mellon/8 counsel for Massachusetts observed 
76. 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976). 
77. U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 4. 
78. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
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that "the proposed appropriations are not general in their appli-
cation, but are confined to those States which accept [the Mater-
nity Act of 1921] and appropriate their own funds to be used for 
its purposes." After quoting Hamilton on the requirement of 
generality, he continued: 
[A]n appropriation by Congress discriminating between 
States which accept its conditions and make appropriations to 
match and States which do not, it is submitted, is on its face 
purely arbitrary, having no legitimate relation to the general 
welfare of the country, and cannot be for the "general welfare 
of the United States." Would any one say for example that 
Congress could appropriate money for the maintenance of 
post office facilities or for the pay of federal judges in those 
States only which should contribute equally towards such ex-
penses, thereby manifestly attempting to coerce the States 
into contributing to the support of the United States Gov-
ernment?79 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sutherland dismissed the 
challenge for want of standing, on the "heads they win, tails you 
lose" bases that coughing up their share of taxes without recip-
rocal benefits burdened the state's taxpayers, not the state gov-
ernment, that the state could not represent the interests of its 
taxpayers vis-a-vis the United States, and that individual taxpay-
ers could not sue because the effect of the federal spending upon 
their individual tax liabilities was too indefinite.80 Thus the dis-
crimination argument slipped out of sight through cracks created 
by since-discarded standing doctrine.81 
C. THE LIMITS OF SPENDING 
Two critical contentions may be derived from the foregoing 
analysis. First, uniformity of taxation precludes discrimination 
by reference to state political identity. Second, a requirement of 
commonality and generality limits the spending power in the 
same way that uniformity limits the taxing power. It follows that 
the power to spend conferred by Article I § 8 cl. 1 does not au-
thorize Congress to make its release of funds to benefit citizens 
conditional on their states' behavior. Congress may condition on 
state policy the method by which it delivers a benefit to citizens, 
79. Id. at 465, 468. 
80. I d. at 482-87. 
81. State challenges to conditional spending statutes were decided on the merits in 
Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) and South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
u.s. 203 (1987). 
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but not the fact of delivery. In other words, Congress may give 
states a choice of conveying the benefit of federal money to their 
citizens in accordance with policy prescribed by Congress or hav-
ing Congress convey the benefit to citizens directly. That much 
follows from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis. Just as Congress 
may give states the option of replacing the federal government 
as both taxer and spender in the implementation of a federal 
program, so Congress may give states the option of replacing the 
federal government only on the spending side of a federal pro-
gram. But Congress cannot give states a choice of spending ac-
cording to federal prescription or depriving their citizens of the 
spending. 
In order for Congress to fulfill its constitutional obligations 
to tax the people of the United States uniformly and to spend for 
their defense and welfare commonly and generally, its spending 
must conform to two requirements. First, its provision for direct 
spending to benefit citizens must not be based upon criteria 
which explicitly reference state political identity. All spending 
must be on conditions, for the obligation to spend only "in Con-
sequence of Appropriations made by Law" contemplates that 
spending will always have an articulated subject.82 Conditions on 
spending which identify a state of affairs prompting payment will 
always indirectly implicate state policy, even if their subject is 
within federal regulatory power, because every state of affairs 
within a state is indirectly affected by state government policy 
choices. For example, "having a school-age child" will at least 
indirectly be influenced by past and present state government 
policy (on child care, tax credits, etc.), but would still be a per-
missible basis for federal spending. The same distinction holds 
on the taxation side. State government policy might encourage 
sales of one item and discourage sales of another, but a federal 
sales tax which applied a higher rate to the first item than to the 
second throughout the United States would still be uniform. 
What destroys constitutional uniformity and generality is condi-
tioning of taxing or spending upon particular state government 
behavior, whether past, present, or future. Conditions which ar-
ticulate what a state must have done, be doing, or promise to do 
cannot be imposed on direct federal taxing or spending. But 
conditions which merely identify a fact or circumstance which 
does not constitute state government behavior (even though 
state government behavior indirectly affects the incidence of that 
82. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 7. 
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fact or circumstance), may be imposed on direct federal taxing 
or spending, with one qualification. Conditions on taxing or 
spending must not explicitly reference state identity, and so can-
not authorize taxing of or spending on persons "in states which" 
have a particular feature. Direct taxing of or spending on any 
legitimate subject is possible without explicit reference to the 
subject's location "in states which" have some characteristic-
the only reason for resort to such a form of condition is to intro-
duce to the subject of taxing or spending an unrelated factual 
proxy for state policy. 
The second spending requirement flowing from Congress's 
obligation of uniformity and generality is that congressional 
spending via state grants must always be part of a federal spend-
ing program which will proceed in all states for the benefit of 
their populations whether state governments choose to partici-
pate or not. State governments may be offered the option of 
spending federal funds in accordance with the policy require-
ments of a federal program, but only where the federal govern-
ment can and will implement the program directly should state 
governments choose not to do so. Objection may be heard that 
Congress should be able to make state grants on the same basis 
as it can spend directly, namely by reference to fact or circum-
stance criteria, without necessarily detailing how the funds must 
be spent. But the constitutional obligations of uniformity and 
generality are imposed upon Congress and are owed to the citi-
zen- Congress is obliged to ensure that federal funds are applied 
to the benefit of citizens in the same way throughout the Union. 
To see this, return to the common-defense hypothetical. Con-
gress cannot present states with a choice of missile-shield cover-
age if their policies conform to federal preferences or cash if 
they don't. Nor may Congress offer state governments a simple 
choice between missile-shield coverage and cash. Federal spend-
ing for the common Defence and general Welfare must benefit 
citizens in the same way irrespective of the political identities of 
their states. If Congress funnels funds through the states, it must 
do so on terms which prescribe how the funds are to be applied 
to the benefit of their citizens, and the terms must be the same as 
those on which Congress will spend directly in those states 
whose governments choose not to participate in the federal 
spending program. Indeed Congress can dictate to states how 
funds are to be spent only if those funds will be so spent whether 
the states choose to participate in the spending or not. States 
may be allowed some discretion in implementation, just as 
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bounded discretions may be conferred upon the federal depart-
ments and agencies which will spend should the states decide not 
to do so, and just as institutional beneficiaries of direct payments 
based on fact or circumstance criteria like "hospital which meets 
operating criteria X, Y and Z" have some discretion in spending, 
bounded by who they are. But Congress cannot just hand state 
governments large lumps (or "blocks") of federal money without 
instructions concerning their use. And Congress cannot give in-
structions unless the federal government can and will implement 
them itself should state governments say no. Thus, for example, 
Congress cannot spend to fund implementation by the states of a 
policy unless Congress can and will implement that policy di-
rectly in any state which chooses not to do so. 
State authorities and institutions may, of course, be benefi-
ciaries of direct federal payments based on fact and circumstance 
criteria like "hospital which meets operating criteria X, Y, and 
Z" or "school which meets educational criteria X, Y, and Z" or 
"highway construction project which meets construction criteria 
X, Y, and Z." Indeed, just as Congress cannot impose discrimi-
natory taxes upon state governments or their agencies,83 Con-
gress cannot deprive state government entities of their share of 
direct federal spending. 
While federal spending is certainly not limited to the sub-
jects over which Congress has regulatory power, the exercise of 
regulatory power is the only way Congress can dictate how state 
governments behave. If Congress validly does so, then the 
spending power may be used to support the Congressional man-
date by furnishing the states with funding to do what Congress 
has validly required them to do. But Congress can never validly 
give states a choice between affording their citizens the benefit 
of federal money and declining to implement a federal regula-
tory scheme. Even where the regulatory power to dictate a 
scheme exists, Congress cannot merely present states with the 
option of forgoing on their citizens' behalf the benefit of federal 
funds, for any exercise of that option would deprive the federal 
spending program of its constitutionally required generality.84 
Congress cannot make receipt of federal benefits by a state's 
83. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 518 n.ll, 523 (1988). 
. 84. The Court has assumed that if Congress has power to require certain things by 
d1rect regulation, then a fortiori Congress may make those things mere conditions of its 
spending. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,475 (1980). The Court's attention was, 
however, not turned to the generality argument made here. 
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citizens contingent on the state's exercise of a choice whether to 
perform a task. 
IV. COERCION 
To this legal analysis of the spending power, coercion is a 
red herring. In skewering arguments against conditional grants 
which allege coercion, the Supreme Court and commentators 
have done little more than make the pellucid point that a choice 
between conforming to federal will or being subjected to dis-
criminatory treatment for failing to do so may be a real choice. 
On the facts of Dole, the threatened loss of 5% of the federal 
highway funds otherwise payable did not make a state's choice 
to keep its drinking age under 21 impossible. But it did dis-
criminate against the people of that state on the basis of a policy 
which their state government was constitutionally entitled to 
maintain. The Dole Court's signal that a federal spending pro-
gram which really did compel compliance with its conditions 
would be invalid seems misconceived. Degrees of effective coer-
cion derive not from the nature of attached conditions, but from 
the extent of a state's need for proffered funds. Genuine need 
for federal funding is surely the paradigm case for federal spend-
ing. It makes little sense to say that the same condition leaves 
spending constitutional if the payment does not promote De-
fence and Welfare much, but renders spending unconstitutional 
if the payment promotes Defence and Welfare a lot! 
Compare the conditions on federal spending with the de-
mands of a panhandler. The coercive character of the panhan-
dler's conduct derives not from what he requests, but from the 
degree of insistence, rising to menace, with which he makes his 
demands. If his behavior in support of the demands is menacing, 
it may be coercive. The demands do not coerce-the back-
ground behavior does, and because that background behavior is 
illegal (whether or not it supports any demands), we may frame 
the legal problem as one of coercion. Likewise, conditions on 
spending do not coerce. Coercive effect derives from a prospec-
tive beneficiary's need for the spending, which compares with 
the pedestrian's degrees of desire to be free from degrees of 
menace. But the prospective beneficiary's need for spending 
does not imply a legal right to that spending, whereas the pedes-
trian does have a legal right to walk free from menace. Framing 
the legal problem in the spending case as one of coercion is 
therefore inapposite. The menacing panhandler's conduct is il-
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legally coercive because it offers a choice between two things to 
which his accosted pedestrian has a legal right- to walk unmo-
lested down the street and to keep his money in his pocket. 
Conditional federal grants to states are not illegally coercive 
unless states are legally entitled both to receive the grants and to 
behave in a manner inconsistent with the conditions. And states 
are not legally entitled to receive the grants. The Constitution 
does not entitle states to federal spending, and even when a pro-
hibition of discriminatory spending is recognized, it is just as well 
obeyed by spending nowhere as by spending everywhere. 
The constitutionality of a condition turns not on whether 
the worthiness of spending effectively coerces compliance, but 
on whether the condition explicitly requires that benefits of the 
spending be distributed among citizens in a way which discrimi-
nates based on their states' policies. Whether the spending 
power authorizes spending on particular terms cannot bear an 
inverse relation to the public importance of the spending. And 
discrimination in fact furnishes the best benchmark of coercive 
effect. If a condition on federal spending lets state policy deter-
mine only the method by which federal spending reaches the citi-
zen, then a state's agreement to play federal funnel will not seem 
imperative to anyone. But if state policymakers risk their citi-
zens' loss of the benefit of federal spending unless they funnel it 
on federal terms, then their compliance is indeed effectively co-
erced. And that remains true however intimately related to the 
subject of spending the federal conditions may be. 
V. RELATEDNESS 
Dole's third limitation, "that conditions on federal grants 
might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal interest 
in particular national projects or programs',"85 was treated by 
that Court as an inquiry into whether conditions on spending 
address the same subject as the spending.86 Disagreement be-
tween the majority and Justice O'Connor turned on the neces-
sary degree of congruence between the subject of the condition 
85. 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 
(1978)). 
86. Id. at 208 n.3. The Court framed the inquiry as concerning the extent to which 
conditions relate to the purpose of spending but it must have meant the subject of spend-
ing, as a purpose inquiry has nowhere to look but to the conditions on which spending is 
offered and affords no basis for privileging the conditions concerning how the money is 
to be spent over other conditions on payment-the latter may well express the primary 
purpose of the whole exercise. 
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and the subject of the spending.87 But the original source of the 
principle is Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,88 and the context in 
which Justice Cardozo spoke of relatedness there reveals that he 
was making a different point. He questioned the constitutional-
ity not of a condition on federal spending unrelated to the sub-
ject of the spending, but of a condition "unrelated in subject 
matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy and 
power. "89 In other words, Cardozo questioned conditions unre-
lated in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of 
what the national government both plans to do (national policy) 
and can do (national power). The relation required by Cardozo 
was to whatever the national government is doing. The national 
government may condition its implementation of a program 
upon whether states would rather implement the program them-
selves in conformity with national policy. What the national 
government cannot do is condition benefit to the people of a 
state upon their state government implementing a federal pro-
posal. States may volunteer to be deputized to collect taxes and 
dispense benefits in accordance with a federal program, but it 
must be a federal program, which is going to be implemented for 
the benefit of the citizens whether their state governments 
choose to be involved or not. Thus the relatedness requirement 
precludes federal conditions which make benefit to the citizens 
of a state turn on state policy. Such conditions would deprive 
citizens of noncompliant states of their share of federal benefits, 
and so destroy the generality of federal spending. 
Justice O'Connor's concern about conditions unrelated in 
subject to the spending upon which they are imposed90 is, how-
ever, satisfied by the spending principles set forth in this article. 
As will be explained later, state-policy conditions which concern 
how federal funds are spent may readily be converted into valid 
fact or circumstance criteria for that spending. But state-policy 
conditions unrelated in subject to the spending are not readily 
recast in valid form. 
VI. THE REST OF THE DOCUMENT 
Dole's fourth limitation steers attention to other provisions 
of the constitutional text which may have something to say about 
87. ld. at 208 n.3, 213-18. 
88. See id. at 212-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
89. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added). 
90. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-18 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting). 
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conditional spending. And among these, only support is found 
for a prohibition of discrimination based on state political iden-
tity. Article IV § 2 d. 1 promises to "[t)he Citizens of each 
State ... all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States," and Article IV § 4 requires the United States to "guar-
antee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment." A privilege of republican citizenship is surely to re-
ceive from government the benefit of one's taxes. The 
Declaration of Independence cited "imposing Taxes on us with-
out our Consent" as a core concern warranting revolution. The 
Constitution of 1787 made such imposition on the citizens of a 
particular state possible, but precluded the greatest evil which 
taxation without consent might otherwise produce-taxation of 
some states purely for the benefit of others.91 Conferring such a 
discriminatory benefit could not be for the general welfare of the 
people of the states, and would deny citizens of the states not 
benefited a privilege of their citizenship. Moreover, taxes ap-
plied not for the general welfare of the people of the states, but 
only for the welfare of the people of those states which acquiesce 
in federal policy proposals, could be characterized as takings of 
private property from the citizens of any state which does not 
acquiesce "for public use without just compensation," in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. Such an understanding certainly 
comports with Professor Epstein's explication of the takings 
clause,92 and fits even if the clause only restricts governmental 
power to acquire assets from citizens.93 
The apparent truism of the tenth amendment here also 
seems to do some real work: "The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
For Congress to deny the people of a state a benefit because of 
the way in which their state government exercises a power re-
served to it by the tenth amendment arguably violates that 
amendment. The Dole Court discounted this contention, citing 
earlier decisions for the proposition that "a perceived Tenth 
Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state af-
fairs d[oes] not concomitantly limit the range of conditions le-
91. The Constitution makes further provision elsewhere against this danger. See 
Art. I,§ 10, cl. 2; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278 (1901). 
92. Epstein, Bargaining with the State at 146 (cited in note 11). Richard A. Epstein, 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 283-305 (Harvard U. Press, 
1985). 
93. Cf.Jed Rubenfeld, "Usings," 102 Yale L.J.1077 (1993). 
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gitimately placed on federal grants. "94 Limitations on the spend-
ing power certainly have nothing to do with state-immunity doc-
trine, but neither does the tenth amendment. In any event, the 
Court's pronouncement answered an argument different from 
the one made here. South Dakota had argued that the "inde-
pendent constitutional bar" limitation was "a prohibition on the 
indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not em-
powered to achieve directly. "95 That line has not been worth try-
ing in the Supreme Court since 1936. 
The "independent constitutional bars" that did excite the 
Dole Court's attention were the provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment and the Bill of Rights, minus number ten. The ex-
amples given by the Court were conditions requiring state gov-
ernments to engage in unconstitutional action, namely "invidi-
ously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment."96 But the Court did not address the dis-
tinct issue whether Congress can condition state grants upon 
state action in which state governments are constitutionally enti-
tled to engage, but in which the federal government is explicitly 
forbidden to engage. As the tenth amendment is an explicit pro-
hibition against federal exercise of powers not possessed, one 
might not expect much illumination from a distinction between 
federal government circumvention of its own want of power and 
federal government circumvention of explicit or structural con-
stitutional limitations upon the exercise of its powers. Yet the 
Court's decision in Washington Airports v. Noise Abatement 
Citizens turned on that distinction.97 The case concerned a prop-
erty transfer rather than spending simpliciter98 -Congress pro-
94. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. 
95. ld. 
96. ld. 
97. 501 u.s. 252 (1991) 
98. For an argument that the power to spend beyond the subjects of federal regula-
tory power actually has its home in Article IV,§ 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power 
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be 
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.") 
see David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 Seattle L. Rev. 215 (1995). 
Professor Engdahl argues that Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 only confers a power to tax, but even if he 
is right that the provision just requires taxation to have the purpose of paying the debts 
and providing for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, the pro-
vision is breached if the proceeds of taxation are not so spent. Moreover, authors of the 
antecedent Articles of Confederation deployed the same language of common defense 
and general welfare to qualify an unambiguous power to spend, which supports resolu-
tion of Article I's ambiguity in favor of a similarly-limited power to spend. See Articles of 
Confederation, Art. VIII: "All charges of war and all other expences [sic] that shall be 
incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, 
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vided for transfer of the National and Dulles airports to a state 
agency established by compact between Virginia and the District 
of Columbia, but conditioned the transfer upon state creation of 
a board of review composed of congressmen and having power 
to veto the state airport authority's decisions. The Court held 
that Congress could not evade separation-of-powers limitations 
upon its supervision of the federal executive by transferring ac-
tivities to the states on condition that they invest its members 
with otherwise-unattainable supervisory power. Justice Stevens, 
for the majority, wrote: 
Congress could, if this Board of Review were valid, use simi-
lar expedients to enable its Members or its agents to retain 
control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activi-
ties of state grant recipients charged with executing virtually 
every aspect of national policy.99 
And, he noted, "[n]othing in our opinion in Dole implied that a 
highway grant to a State could have been conditioned on the 
State's creating a 'Highway Board of Review' composed of 
Members of Congress."100 If conditional spending cannot be 
used to circumvent the separation of powers, why can it be used 
to circumvent the tenth amendment? The Court's answer boiled 
down to an assertion of belief that the separation of powers mat-
ters more than federalism. 101 
Under the Australian Constitution, which authorizes condi-
tional grants to state governments/02 a distinction between cir-
cumventing mere want of power and circumventing explicit re-
strictions on power was critical to the Australian High Court's 
decision in the Magennis case.103 The Court condemned legisla-
tion which explicitly facilitated a federal government attempt to 
circumvent the Australian Constitution's "just terms" require-
ment for federal compulsory acquisitions.104 The federal gov-
in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury ... " 
99. Noise Abatement Citizens, 501 U.S. at 277. 
100. ld. at 271. 
101. Id. 
102. Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, § 96: "During a period of ten 
years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament 
otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on such 
terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit." This provision could plausibly have 
been construed merely to authorize payments to assist states with their general revenue 
requirements, subject to such terms and conditions concerning repayment as the Parlia-
ment thought fit. Instead, it has become a flexible instrument of federal influence over 
state behavior. 
103. P.J. Magennis Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, 80 C.L.R. 382 (1949). 
104. Australian Constitution,§ 51(xxxi). 
554 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:517 
ernment agreed with the State of New South Wales that the fed-
eral government would finance a state government compulsory 
acquisition of land in support of a federal postwar soldier-
settlement scheme. The agreement explicitly provided for the 
land to be acquired at prices fixed by reference to market value 
at a specified date several years earlier. The Court held that 
federal legislation authorizing the agreement with the states to 
fund their compulsory acquisitions under the scheme violated 
the constitutional limitation on federal acquisitions. But the se-
quel to that story is instructive. The New South Wales state par-
liament simply amended its legislation to authorize compulsory 
acquisitions under the scheme independent of the legality of the 
federal-state agreement. The state government then finished the 
land grab, in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement 
and quite possibly with the added understanding that future fed-
eral largesse might depend upon its action. Lacking a generality 
limitation to enforce, the Australian High Court was powerless 
to block the flow of federal funds to the scheme.105 A constitu-
tional jurisprudence which precluded discrimination based on 
state policy would have insisted that the federal soldier-
settlement spending program proceed only on terms which the 
federal government was willing and able to implement directly in 
any state which chose not to participate. Thus a nondiscrimina-
tion principle may stymie such constitutionally corrosive inter-
governmental machinations. 
VII. CONDITIONAL GRANTS AND 
INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 
My focus thus far has been upon federal spending condi-
tioned on state behavior, but what of federal spending condi-
tioned on individual behavior? Conditions requiring individual 
behavior qualify all direct payments to individuals. Even direct 
spending (or taxation) explicitly by reference to state policy in-
volves targeting an individual action which brings the person 
benefited (or taxed) into relation with the state, such as resi-
dence, travel, property ownership, or commercial activity 
therein. Thus the requirement that state policy conditions not 
be placed upon direct taxation of, or payments to, individuals, is 
a requirement that the criterion for liability or benefit not explic-
itly reference whether individuals' actions bring them into rela-
105. Pye v. Renshaw, 84 C.L.R. 58, 83 (1951). 
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tion with a state having policy or feature A rather than policy or 
feature B. 
But satisfying a criterion for liability or benefit may implic-
itly turn on the state policies with which an individual is saddled. 
This troubling truth helps explain the much criticized trajectory 
of the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Butler, 
which can be understood as an attempt to answer the following 
question: What of conditions for favorable federal treatment 
which require individual behavior that state governments retain 
constitutional capacity to preclude or conditions for unfavorable 
federal treatment which target individual behavior that state 
governments retain constitutional capacity to command? As 
noted earlier, even federal regulatory power over the subject of 
an individual-behavior condition cannot exclude all of the indi-
rect effects which state government policies have on incidence of 
that behavior. But federal regulatory power, where it exists, can 
be used to trump state prohibitions and requirements of individ-
ual behavior. The difficult potential conditions on direct federal 
benefits and taxes, then, are these: a condition for favorable 
treatment which requires individual behavior that the federal 
Constitution neither requires states to permit nor empowers 
Congress to authorize, and a condition for unfavorable treat-
ment which targets individual behavior that the federal Constitu-
tion neither prevents states from commanding nor empowers 
Congress to prohibit. Where Congress is empowered to regulate 
the field, its stipulation of individual-behavior conditions may be 
supported by regulations which trump state government barriers 
to performance. But what if Congress has no such separate 
power? For example, "having school-age children at a school 
which meets educational criteria X, Y, and Z" identifies individ-
ual behavior and does not explicitly relate that behavior to state 
policy. But in fact it depends upon the citizen educating his chil-
dren in a state which permits schools meeting criteria X, Y, and 
Z to operate within its borders. Can this be imposed as a condi-
tion of federal spending if Congress lacks, or has failed to exer-
cise, regulatory power to authorize operation of such schools 
throughout the United States? 
The Butler Court thought not. Noting that contracts for re-
duction of acreage and control of production did not fall within 
federal regulatory power as then construed, the Court opined: 
An appropriation to be expended by the United States under 
contracts calling for violation of a state duty clearly would of-
fend the Constitution. Is a statute less objectionable which 
556 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:517 
authorizes expenditure of federal moneys to induce action in 
a field in which the United States has no power to intermed-
dle? The Congress cannot invade state jurisdiction to compel 
individual action; no more can it purchase such action.106 
The Court acknowledged federal power to spend beyond the 
subjects of federal regulatory power, but struck down the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act as "a statutory plan to regulate and 
control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers 
delegated to the federal government. "107 Some commentators 
have treated these conclusions as contradictory,108 but they are 
not. Butler's principle does not prevent Congress from passing 
out money to the people by reference to subjects outside federal 
regulatory power. But Butler says that Congress cannot attach 
its choice of individual-behavior conditions to federal payments 
if state governments have a tenth amendment right to regulate 
that behavior. And states do have such a right unless the Consti-
tution excludes it or confers on Congress power to trump it. 
Under Butler's vision of a spending power only exercisable when 
it does not invade the substance of state regulatory responsibil-
ity, Congress could spend on any subject outside federal regula-
tory power simply by adopting state regulatory criteria. Thus 
Butler's approach to spending would allow the criteria for fed-
eral spending to vary from state to state in order to accommo-
date exercise of the states' regulatory prerogatives. Suppose one 
state permitted schools which met educational criteria X, Y, and 
Z, but another state permitted only schools which met educa-
tional criteria X, Y, but not Z. Consistent with Butler, Congress 
could make direct payments using a criterion of "having school-
age children at a school which meets state educational criteria." 
Thus Butler's reasoning does not prevent federal spending be-
yond the subjects of federal regulatory power, it just robs that 
spending of an independent regulatory role. 
The logic of Butler's approach to spending conditions would 
condemn a federal tax imposed on sales that state governments 
have a right to prohibit or command. But Butler's attempt to 
shelter subjects of state regulatory responsibility from the effects 
of federal spending cannot be reconciled with the weight of au-
thority addressing what uniformity means. The Court in 
106. Butler, 297 U.S. at 73. 
107. I d. at 68. 
108. See Engdahl, 44 Duke L.J. at 36-37 (cited in note 11); Laurence H. Tribe, 1 
American Constitutional Law 836 n.l4 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2000). 
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Knowlton v. Moore 109 emphatically took the position, consis-
tently approved since, that Congress can tax individual behavior 
notwithstanding that behavior's susceptibility to state regulation. 
"The extent and incidence of federal taxes not infrequently are 
affected by differences in state laws; but such variations do not 
infringe the constitutional prohibitions against delegation of the 
taxing power or the requirement of geographical uniformity. "110 
Uni-form means of one form, not one effect. Congress can tax 
what some states require and spend on what some states ban. 
For Congress to accommodate its taxing and spending to the 
stances of state policy would require departure from the princi-
ple that each federal fiscal measure have one form throughout 
the United States. Though the Court's approach in Ptasynski 
undercuts this formalist principle by allowing departures from 
geographical uniformity so long as they do not implicate state 
political identity and are rational, it leaves intact the proposition 
that Congress is required by the obligations of uniformity, com-
monality, and generality to present citizens with benefits and 
burdens which do not differ by reference to their states' policy 
choices. Under Butler's approach, Congress could spend federal 
money on education throughout the United States, but could not 
insist that the federal funds spent in Alabama and the federal 
funds spent in Massachusetts purchase products which equally 
deserve the description "education." 
Federal taxing and spending conditioned on individual be-
havior which state governments have a right to prohibit or re-
quire, like federal taxing and spending conditioned on any other 
state of affairs which state government policy affects, is constitu-
tional. This allows much federal taxing and spending which 
would otherwise be conditioned on state policy to be condi-
tioned with identical effect on individual behavior. But not all. 
Take, for example, a state grant conditioned on the recipient 
state spending the money on hospitals which meet operating cri-
teria X, Y, and Z, and conditioned on the state imposing a 
minimum drinking age of at least 21. Under Dole's vision of the 
spending power, the grant must be a lawful exercise of Con-
gress's power to provide for the general Welfare of the United 
States, because the extra danger on highways created by teenage 
drinking is less related to highway construction than the extra 
demands on hospitals created by such behavior are to hospital 
109. 178 U.S. at 108. 
110. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 602 (1931), (Brandeis, J. for a unani-
mous Court.) 
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operations. I have sought to explain that the constitutionality of 
the grant turns on what Congress can and will do should the 
state choose not to accept it. The grant is lawful if upon its rejec-
tion, Congress will spend the funds directly on in-state hospitals 
meeting operating criteria X, Y, and Z, and Congress will exer-
cise its own regulatory power to impose a minimum drinking age 
of at least 21. The grant is unlawful if, upon rejection, Congress 
cannot or will not do both those things. 
Now look at what happens in a world where the thesis of 
this article is accepted. To spend without directly regulating, 
Congress is forced to turn the state grants into direct payments 
to hospitals meeting operating criteria X, Y, and Z, but may give 
the states an option to funnel the payments on those terms. The 
casualty of the change is the condition on the state grant which is 
insufficiently related to the subject of the spending. It is not pos-
sible to reformulate the minimum drinking age criterion as an 
individual-behavior condition on direct payments to the hospi-
tals. Because it is unrelated to the actual spending of the money, 
that state-policy condition cannot shed its state-policy skin. A 
formal generality requirement which precludes explicit condi-
tioning of federal benefits upon state political identity is suffi-
cient to eliminate such unrelated state-policy conditions on fed-
eral spending. As already explained, the requirement not only 
precludes state-policy conditions, but also any non-policy fact 
condition which explicitly references state identity, a form un-
avoidable only where the condition is a stranger to the spending 
and is actually serving as a surrogate for state policy. Thus con-
ditions in the form "in states which have more than ten drunk-
driving accidents per 100,000 people per year" or "in states in 
which a standardized teenage drinking survey shows more than 
20% of teenagers drink regularly" are as doomed as the drinking 
age policy condition itself. Highly relevant conditions, like the 
operations of hospitals on which funds are to be spent, easily 
convert to individual behavior criteria, or to other blameless fact 
or circumstance criteria. But irrelevant conditions, like the state 
drinking age, cannot convert without explicit reference to state 
identity ("in states which ... "). Even if non-policy fact criteria 
referring to state identity were tolerated, finding factual proxies 
for state-policy conditions would be challenging, for most plau-
sible candidates would not correlate cleanly with incidence of 
the policy Congress sought to favor. For example, suppose Con-
gress conditions its payments to hospitals upon meeting operat-
ing criteria X, Y, and Z, and upon their presence in states with 
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less than a specified annual per capita rate of drunk-driving mo-
tor vehicle accidents. The rate of drunk-driving accidents may 
well be positively correlated with lower state drinking ages, but 
the correlation is unlikely to be perfect. Whatever rate of acci-
dents Congress specifies, some states which have the policy Con-
gress favors may miss out on funds, while some states with lower 
drinking ages may qualify for funds. 
Congress's pork-barrelling power to spend with geographic 
specificity, a correlative of the power to tax with geographic 
specificity recognized by the Court in Ptasynski, seems a more 
promising vehicle for controlling state policy. But as the Ptasyn-
ski Court made clear, geographic specification is the prime cir-
cumstance in which the Court will search for evidence of con-
gressional purpose, and will strike down measures designed to 
attack state political identity. Whatever the merits of such a ju-
dicial inquiry, Ptasynksi makes it the Court's approach, and al-
lows geographic specification only on the basis that such an in-
quiry will determine constitutionality. A future Court may well 
require that in order to spend with geographic specificity, Con-
gress must set forth general fact and circumstance criteria for its 
spending, and justify its geographically specific distribution un-
der those criteria, much as an administrator would otherwise 
have to do. 
To reflect further on how fiscal relations would work under 
the regime proposed, take the example of Congressional direct 
spending by reference to the individual-behavior criterion of 
"having school-age children at a school which meets educational 
criteria X, Y, and Z." Congress may allow state governments to 
spend federal money by reference to that criterion as an alterna-
tive to Congress doing so. But the state governments must 
spend the money in the way that Congress wants to do and has 
power to do, that is, by direct payments to those meeting the cri-
terion. Federal payments to states must be subject to conditions 
concerning their use which mirror what the federal government 
can and will do in states that refuse them. Congress cannot fi-
nance state activities which it cannot replicate in states whose 
governments decline to pursue them. If Congress has regulatory 
power to run school systems meeting educational criteria X, Y, 
and Z, it may do so and afford the states the alternative of doing 
so in its stead. But if Congress only has power to spend on the 
subject, then a parallel pattern of spending is all that it can fi-
nance the states to do. Moreover, while Congress might directly 
fund "schools meeting educational criteria X, Y, and Z," and let 
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states pass out the money if they wished, it could not define its 
subject of funding as "state-run schools meeting educational cri-
teria X, Y, and Z," for that would explicitly condition payments 
upon state policy. 
VIII. WHO GOES TO COURT? 
The uniformity of taxation and the commonality and gener-
ality of spending are constitutional obligations upon the federal 
government imposed to protect the citizens of the United States, 
not their state governments. It is the citizen who suffers the 
primary injury when his state government does not receive fed-
eral funds because of noncompliance with a state-policy condi-
tion, just as it is the taxpayer who is injured when subject to 
higher federal tax rates or lower rebates than his counterparts in 
other states on account of his state's policies. But the Supreme 
Court's recognition of state government standing to challenge 
conditional federal grants to the states111 acknowledges that dis-
criminatory denial of those federal benefits injures the state too. 
Indeed discriminatory denial even of directly paid federal bene-
fits injures the state. Recall that unconstitutional discrimination 
in spending occurs when denial of federal benefits is not accom-
panied by a compensating reduction in federal taxes which lets 
states fill the federal government's shoes. When the federal 
government swipes uniform shares of the states' tax bases, but 
confers non-uniform benefits upon their people, a state whose 
citizens miss out on federal benefits is injured by the loss of that 
part of its tax base which went federal purely for the benefit of 
other states. 
Likewise, individual taxpayers in the disfavored state are in-
jured by having to pay a slice of federal tax purely for the benefit 
of those in other states as surely as if rebates of their taxes 
turned upon state compliance with federal conditions. Taxpayer 
standing to challenge illegal federal spending seems a sensible 
counterpart to prospective-beneficiary standing to enforce state 
compliance with conditions on legal federal spending.112 Such 
taxpayer standing was rejected by the Court in the taxpayer suit 
brought alongside Massachusetts' challenge to the federal Ma-
111. See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm., 330 U.S. 127 (1947); South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
112. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992); Pennhurst 
St. Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1981); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 
(1980). 
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ternity Act of 1921 on the basis that impact of the illegal spend-
ing on individual taxpayers' liabilities was too "indefinite."113 
More recently, the Court has suggested that taxpayers may have 
standing to challenge federal spending which "exceeds specific 
constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the con-
gressional taxing and spending power."114 No constitutional limi-
tation on congressional spending is more specific than the obli-
gation to keep it general. 
CONCLUSION 
The vision of the spending power set forth above grows 
from an understanding of the relation between taxes a govern-
ment demands of its people and expenditures it makes for their 
well-being. That understanding finds recognition in the Consti-
tution's reciprocal insistence upon uniformity on one hand and 
commonality and generality on the other. Restoring life to these 
constitutional commands is a project irreconcilable with some 
Supreme Court precedent. But the necessary departure from 
past decisionmaking is no more substantial than that implicit in 
the Court's recent reconsideration of the commerce power's 
reach.115 And the significance of that reconsideration is severely 
stunted absent a corresponding reconsideration of the power to 
spend. Even if the Court were to eschew an "effects" inquiry 
completely in its commerce clause analysis, and to insist that the 
subject of regulation itself fall within a judicial definition of in-
terstate, foreign or Indian commerce, and even if the treaty 
power were held only to authorize agreements with foreign sov-
ereigns about what we do or forbear from doing to each other, 
and not a?reements about what we do or forbear from doing to 
ourselves, 16 still the Congress could shape governance on every 
113. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,488 (1923). 
114. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). The Court has since shown little 
enthusiasm for applying this standing rule to taxpayers. It applies only where the 
measure challenged is a pure exercise of the power conferred by Art. I, § 8, cl.l (see 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982)) and the establishment clause is the only "specific constitutional 
limitation" consistently acknowledged to enjoy taxpayer enforcement under it. See, e.g., 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,618 (1988). 
115. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995). 
116. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (Holmes, J.): "The subject-
matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein." Sub-
jects of modem treating-making are often much more domesticated. Even if a treaty's 
implementation requires the consent of both Houses of Congress via legislation (see 
John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
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subject via conditional spending. Yet the constitutional founda-
tion of such spending is shakier than that of the broad readings 
of regulatory power for which it so readily substitutes. Only 
when this is recognized can we honor the Constitution's com-
mand that the national government's fiscal relations with its 
people be "uniform throughout the United States." 
Original Understanding, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (1999)), is Congress authorized to im-
plement any domestic regulatory regime which a treaty may ~and~te, however far be-
yond congressional regulatory power that regrme would otherwise be. 
